President Trump won an Electoral College majority in 2016 bolstered by voters who supported him, but not the previous nominee, Mitt Romney. Evidence suggests that a campaign promising a more restrictive immigration policy was the key to this improved performance among cross-pressured voters. In the months since inauguration day 2017, however, voters did not remain unaware of the administration's programmatic steps on immigration and the opposition they encountered. I interpret evidence from a panel survey to suggest that voters gained knowledge about immigration policy after 2016, and began to align their policy views with the positions of their favored political parties. Inasmuch as voters' policy positions become identical with their party preference, the potential for immigration policy to again act as a wedge issue in 2020 is greatly reduced. President Trump's 2020 campaign may be able to mobilize more base voters given this increase in policy-party congruence but he may not be as successful as in 2016 in attracting crossover voters.
Introduction
The 2016 election divided the electorate not only by the usual factors that always shape political behavior: party identification, race, religious observance, the influence of neighbors, family and friends, but also by issues the major campaigns identified as important to a governing agenda if elected. Probably most prominent among these was President Trump's focus on immigration policy (Gimpel 2017) . Even after accounting for the conventional explanations for vote choice, whether a voter took a more restrictive or generous stand on immigration helped decide their vote. For weak and leaning partisans and independents whose views on immigration are not already determined by the strength of a party identity, consonance with the president's thrust on immigration meant a vote for him in November whereas disagreement pushed you in the opposite direction (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017) . Policy positioning can sometimes be informative particularly if campaigns and candidates are consistent enough to hammer on a few basic themes.
Here the question is whether immigration policy continued to inform voter decision making by 2018, well into the first term. It is never obvious that issues matter in elections, particularly given contemporary high levels of political sidetaking. After all, if parties take opposing positions on divisive issues, and voters are strong party identifiers with the characteristic high levels of knowledge of campaign and party platforms, issues offer no new information. Issue talk in a campaign is just more hot air. Certainly when asked, highly informed partisans will report that issues matter. That does not mean that they do when voters are reliant on identity-anchored cues.
For those voters who are not strong party identifiers, the case for issue voting has to overcome the readily demonstrable ignorance of the electorate. Many studies have pointed to the fact that voters are largely unable to identify the positions taken by candidates, and even their own views, much less make a match between the two (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993; Bartels 1996; Carpini, and Keeter 1996; Kinder 1998; Lenz 2012) . Other studies have shown a pervasive tendency for voters to misidentify the issues in a campaign, attributing the wrong positions to the rival candidates (Dalager 1996) and incorrect votes to their members of Congress (Dancey and Sheagley 2016) .
Clearly not all voting preferences are highly reasoned. Even if voters do not go through rigorously rational comparisons of candidate and party positioning, however, less informed and less polarized voters do gain knowledge from encountering political information from campaign and media sources. Weak party identifiers are less aware than strong partisans of the connection between issue positions and traditional party stands, putting a campaign in a position to offer them additional information that contributes to a decision. Exposure to advertising or attention to other forms of political communication seems to at least have a modest, albeit temporary effect on opinion. These studies clear away some room for messages about issues and policies to be more than just wasted breath. Voters apparently also inject their own personal concerns into a political campaign, mentioning issues they hold deep convictions about even when those have not been actively discussed in a particular contest (Dalager 1996, p. 504; Skitka and Bauman 2008) . Issues may become salient to voters because they have heard about them in previous elections, or from any number of non-campaign sources. The issues of a presidential campaign can easily carry-over into thinking about a contemporaneous lower ballot election, and perhaps across short spans of time into a mid-term election. Some high profile issues are just constantly in the news, or are constant national concerns for an enduring period of time, an indication that national media have influenced what voters consider to be important (Dalager 1996, p. 505-507) . A group interest can be vaguely identified as underlying a particular identification but it may not be a contemporary, widelydiscussed, interest (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, p. 74) . Perhaps policy considerations were important at some point in the past, as partisan identities initially formed, but the original events and circumstances that produced those alignments have largely faded from memory. These are all ways in which issues may play some role in shaping vote choice.
Issue-oriented campaign outreach may be informative for voters when positions cut across traditional party lines, or when voters take positions that are incongruent with their generally preferred political party (Hillygus and Shields 2008; Jacobson 2015; Green 2019) . This is the familiar notion of cross-pressure, in which a political party alignment exerts influence in one direction, while a preferred policy viewpoint pulls the voter in a different direction. Under these circumstances the ambivalence of voters can open them to persuasion by a party or candidate other than the one they might ordinarily support. Cross-pressured voters have been found to change their minds about candidates up until quite late in the campaign (Chaffee and Rimal 1996) . Because of their ambivalence they are politically unstable, and often wind up splitting their tickets Mulligan 2011; Davis and Mason 2016) . There is also some potential for cross-pressured voters to exhibit lower interest in elections and not vote at all Margolis 2018) . This is an important reason why campaigns that raise cross-cutting issues may not benefit from crossover or splitticket voting. If the level of mobilization drops then any measureable gains from persuasion may be off-set by a countervalent drop in turnout.
In summary, voters do have strong party identities, but they also have interests, collect new information and exercise rationality in sizing up their choices (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, p. 322) . The extent to which these influences on decision shape individual political behavior is variable across citizens, and from election-to-election. Contests vary in the extent to which they evoke greater identity-based activism as opposed to cross-group and cross-party movement. Not surprisingly, campaigns also appear to shape the timing of vote decision (Henderson and Hillygus 2016) .
In midterm elections, we can expect voters to carry over some recall of issues raised in the previous presidential election. Throughout the first 2 years, immigration policy continued to receive a great deal of media attention as the new administration assumed office and made efforts to fulfill campaign promises on items such as building a southern border wall and reforming the nation's approach to illegal and legal immigration. The drop in participation in mid-term elections is of some consequence, however, particularly if the lower rate of involvement is present among those with weaker party identities and among those subject to cross-pressures. An issue that benefits a party in a high-stimulus, high-turnout election may wind up hurting that same party if these same cross-pressured voters do not consistently show up from one election to the next. This may explain why President Trump's party did not fare well in the mid-term elections even though the immigration issue remained as salient to voting in 2018 as it was in 2016. Immigration may have played a similar role in the decision making of those who voted in both the 2016 and 2018 elections but the 2018 electorate was differently constituted. This would surely be the case if a large share of Trump supporters were low information, peripheral voters, who did not return to vote in 2018 (Fording and Schram 2017) .
The alternative explanation, to be developed below, is that voters who did participate in both elections have brought their immigration attitudes more closely into line with their party identities. They could have also changed their minds on the immigration issue, but it is more likely that immigration policy has simply lost its influence in their decision making because political party positioning has taken over. Ironically, opinions on an issue can become more polarized, but that issue can also lose political influence if the evolution of opinion is consistent with partisan alignment. Drawing from a panel study across several recent election years, the same voters responding in each wave, I set forth the descriptive statistics on the development of immigration opinion on the following pages, then turn to address the possibility that immigration opinion has become more divisive in partisan terms but less influential as a wedge issue.
Data Analysis
The data for this analysis are drawn from the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group surveys carried out by YouGov, combining waves of online panel respondents from 2011-2012, 2016, 2017 and 2018. 1 Many of the same questions of interest in this research were repeated across three or more waves of the panel, offering some picture of attitude change among the participants. There was some panel attrition, as not all respondents participated in each wave, but there was also substantial continuity, as more than 4000 panelists surveyed in the initial wave also participated in the subsequent ones. In addition to this opportunity to observe opinion change among a representative sample of voters, the 2018 wave also included a large Hispanic oversample, providing a helpful gauge of the opinions of a subgroup thought to have an important stake in immigration policy. The YouGov panel consists largely of respondents who indicated in 2018 that they were registered voters (94 percent), with 78 percent declaring their intention to vote.
Since 2016 a number of social science studies have attempted to explain Trump support, with explanations going to symbolic racism and xenophobia, economic hardship, status anxiety, and other issue-related factors aside from party identification (Morgan and Lee 2018; Mutz 2018; Vidal 2018; Wright and Esses 2019; Green and McElwee 2019) . Trump's support was sufficiently distinct from that of the previous Republican nominee, Mitt Romney, to merit these efforts. Not surprisingly, few if any researchers have denied some role for immigration policy attitudes, whether they ultimately attribute those to racial prejudice, to a preoccupation with declining status, or some conception of labor market threat. Given how much emphasis the Trump campaign placed on immigration policy, we should not be surprised to see that it shaped candidate evaluation in 2016, even producing some crossover support (Gimpel 2017) . But does it show up to influence voting for other offices in the mid-term election of 2018?
Measure of Immigration Attitudes
To carry out plausible tests of the impact of immigration opinion on voting, a reasonable place to begin is with an additive index out of the responses to three survey items tapping immigration opinion. Because immigration is a multifaceted area of public policy researchers commonly combine survey measures rather rely upon a single item to gauge opinion. Opinion is also more accurately measured with combinations of similar, scalable, items covering the same theme rather from singular survey questions Snyder 2006, 2008) . These three items read as follows, and the crosstabulated results by party identification are reported in the Appendix for each wave: -Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain? -Do you favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the US to become US citizens? -Do you think it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the US legally than it is currently?
As constructed, this measure ranges from 1 to 8, where 8 indicates the most restriction-oriented response and 1 represents opinion-holding favorable to generous immigration. 2 There are 2363 respondents for whom the scale can be constructed for each wave of the panel. Histograms of the distribution of responses for each of the four waves are shown in Figure 1 . Across the respondents common to all four waves, the distribution of opinion is remarkably similar, suggesting substantial stability and continuity in aggregate opinion. Standard difference in means tests for pairings show statistically significant differences in the distributions, though the substantive differences are arguable. The mean level of restrictionist sentiment does shift downward slightly from the 2011 (4.93) survey to 2016 (4.88) (p ≤ 0.07), downward again in 2017 (4.44) (p ≤ 0.01), then back up in 2018 (4.72) (p ≤ 0.01), though still not back to the level it started from. 3 Focusing only on the means obscures notable aspects of changing variation at the poles of the distribution. The increase in the influence of partisan polarization on the issue from 2011 to 2016 is apparent as it became a high-profile campaign theme, pushing the party faithful in opposite directions. Between the two earliest waves, Republican respondents shift in a decidedly more restrictionist direction while Democrats move opposite. By the 2016 wave, about 57 percent of Strong Republicans scored either a 7 or an 8 on the restriction scale, but by 2018 this was up to 61 percent. Sharper leftward movement is shown among Democrats as indicated by the arrows in Figure 1 : in 2016 about 35.8 percent of Strong Democrats took the most generous position on immigration, but by 2018 this jumps to 52.1 percent. Among Democrats (who are not strong) and Democratic leaners, there is also movement toward the liberal pole (see Appendix Tables A1 to A4) .
Notably, in the aggregate, restrictionist views do not gain any ground from 2016 to 2018 among these panel respondents, remaining at about 31 percent. The most generous immigration position, though, does gain adherents, moving from 19 to 25 percent (see Tables A1 to A4 ). My argument is that this reflects the partisan socialization process at work: as voters become more informed about immigration policy they learn where the political parties and candidates stand. Their views on policy shift into alignment with their partisan commitments.
While larger shares of partisans reach polar opposite conclusions about immigration policy by 2018 it remains apparent throughout this period that independents favor the more restrictionist position, giving President Trump an edge with late-deciding voters who might care about this issue. In the 2011 survey, about 38% of independents scored a 7-8, compared to only 12 percent who were at a 1-2. Similar results obtain in 2016, with independents again leaning more toward restriction. In 2017 there is a noticeable drop in the percentage of independents at the restrictive pole, but this rises again in 2018: 38 percent favoring restriction, 18 percent taking the most generous policy position. Across the four waves, the number of independents with moderate immigration views has diminished somewhat, but more independents are now sympathetic to generous immigration policy than were before (see Appendix  Tables A1 to A4 ).
Immigration Policy Declining as a Wedge Issue
The association between party identification and immigration policy views reaches a local peak by 2018. Looking ahead, there is little reason to expect immigration policy will become less politicized in 2020. This could undercut Presi- dent Trump's bid to use immigration as a wedge issue in 2020 to attract crossover support. Plainly there are fewer restrictionist and ambivalent Democrats as party positioning has become more familiar to voters over time. The tendency for Democrats to bring their viewpoints more into alignment with their political party loyalties may help to account for the Republicans' lackluster performance in 2018 in spite of the president making immigration a major policy focus during his first 2 years. One might counter this reasoning by pointing out that as long as Republicans also move in a more polar direction then any losses President Trump may experience among restrictionist Democrats he will make up by attracting more party-congruent Republicans. As a result, the 2020 election will be much more about mobilizing the base than about persuasion. There is something to this argument. But the data examined here seem to suggest a greater movement by Democrats toward the generous end of the immigration continuum than by Republicans toward the restriction end. Republicans were already heavily concentrated at the restriction pole in 2016. It is Democrats who appear to have more closely aligned their immigration views with their party preferences.
Political Preference 2016 and 2018
Examining the data using standard multivariate statistical tools shows some important differences in support from 2016 to 2018. A logistic regression analysis for the Clinton-Trump vote in 2016, and the choice of House candidate in 2018, appears in Appendix Table A5 . Explanatory variables include immigration opinion, party identification, economic evaluation, race, age, income, and education. Overall, the effects of immigration on vote choice controlling for these common covariates are very similar across the 2 years. This does speak to the stability of opinions once formed and also when aggregated across the entire voting population. But for subgroups there are also notable changes in the distribution of views on immigration and changes in the extent of their association with expressed political preferences. For instance, Figure 2 illustrates the changes by political party identification between the 2016 and 2018 waves. The Y-axis shows the probability of a Republican vote for president (2016) and House (2018). The X-axis displays positions along the immigration opinion scale from most generous to most restrictive. The solid lines show the probability of Republican support by Republican (red) and Democratic (blue) partisans for 2018, with dashed lines for 2016.
The results are largely consistent with the cross-tabulations reported above. Respondents voting preferences become more consistent with the dominant positions expressed by their political party majorities, and immigration opinion is less influential. Republicans who are for generous immigration policy are more likely to support a Republican House candidate in 2018 than they were to vote for President Trump in 2016. Democrats who favor immigration restriction are less likely to support a Republican in 2018 than they were in 2016. Democrats who are for a generous immigration policy support Democrats both times, and the same for Republicans who favor restriction. All the movement is among those holding party incongruent or cross-pressured positions. women holding restrictionist views also fall sharply in their Republican support, by nearly 20 points, 60 percent to 41 percent.
Educational Attainment: Some College, No Degree
What about those with moderate levels of educational attainment, specifically those who have had some college, but have not obtained a 2-year or 4-year college degree? These voters are said to constitute a swing constituency, earning lower incomes, and considered vulnerable to labor market adjustments. They also might readily express reservations about immigration on the grounds that it might adversely influence their social and economic status. Figure 4 depicts the relationship and shows this subgroup to be no exception to the general pattern in Figures 2 and 3 . Republicans with some college who show sympathy for a more generous immigration policy move back to supporting their party between 2016 and 2018, surging 16 points. Democrats with some college move directly opposite, by a slightly greater magnitude. Even voters thought to be most sensitive to immigration policy move toward conventional party majority positions across the two waves of the YouGov panel. 
Other Levels of Education
As it turns out, these data serve to document the same pattern of partisan division re-securing a dominant position over a cross-cutting issue for other electoral subgroups. For those with only a high school education, for example, the patterns are much the same as shown in Figure 4 . For those with a 4-year college degree there is also a move in the direction of party congruence (not shown).
What about Independents?
Probably the best targets for political persuasion on immigration remain nonaligned or weakly aligned voters who may not be taking much notice of party positions, are not likely to follow political events very closely, and/or may well substitute someone else's judgment for their own as the election approaches. Figure 5 shows that for independents and leaners with less education but with some inclination to favor a generous immigration policy there is a movement in a Republican direction between 2016 and 2018 ( Figure 5) . Those with only a high school diploma shift toward Republicans (19 points) more so than those with some college (10 points). There is no movement for those at the restrictionist pole. But these independent voters may be showing an increased willingness to support Republican candidates even if they hold policy views that run opposite to where a majority of Republicans stand on this issue. These voters are likely to be quite unstable in their political preferences throughout the campaign, however, so no one should read Figure 5 to be anything but a very temporary estimate.
Discussion and Conclusions
Certainly in aggregate the differences reported here between 2016 and 2018 appear to be minimal. The probability of casting a Republican vote in 2018 is very similar to the probability of supporting Donald Trump in 2016 once the usual covariates are included (see Table A6 ). One might conclude from the results in the appendix tables that nothing appreciably changed. A real test of what's changed, however, would require an examination of how well the 2016 values of the independent variables explain a 2018 outcome, not how the 2018 versions of those variables do in explaining the outcome. I do not conduct this kind of "true" panel analysis here, but the design of the data collection certainly invites it. Within this subject population there do appear to be changes in relationships among explanatory variables between 2016 and 2018 that should not be ignored. Chiefly, the role of party identification, already strong in 2016, grows even stronger. Though the impact of the immigration issue on the vote also seems to register at about the same magnitude, for some subgroups it also weakens because of greater polarization by party. Resulting shifts may offset each other in aggregate, producing much the same means, but the distributional differences may dictate a very different campaign strategy for 2020, perhaps one that relies on the politics of immigration to activate base voters who have come to care even more about it, but not to play much of a persuasive role for partisans on the other side. If a political preference becomes virtually identical with party identification, then all restrictionists vote one way, and everyone for liberalized immigration votes the other. Immigration opinion and party identification become so mutually reinforcing that there is little possibility for persuasion-oriented movement. Complete partisan polarization is not where opinion stood in 2018 but there is evidence for movement in that direction. There are still partisans who are crosspressured by holding views opposed by a majority of their co-partisans, but there are fewer of them than in 2016. My best guess is that there will be even fewer still by the Fall of 2020.
Wedge issues cannot be cross-cutting and helpful to a campaign's persuasive efforts if they come to align partisans too perfectly. The augmented partisan side-taking on immigration visible in these opinion surveys comes with a measurable reduction in the heterogeneity and inconsistency of opinions necessary to create flows of voters across party lines. If President Trump's 2016 victory is partly attributable to crossover Democratic voters who will not be as supportive in 2020, these losses will have to be made up somewhere else, perhaps through greater mobilization, or deployment of a new issue with cross-cutting power. Greater partisan intensity on an issue could certainly heighten turnout, resolving ambivalence and contributing to an earlier decision on whom to support. But it is not immediately clear whether such an increase in resolve will benefit one party as opposed to the other if large blocs of voters on both sides wind up with more resolute and party-congruent views. Because most YouGov panelists report being voters, or intending to vote, other research will have to estimate the impact that greater partisan alignment on immigration and other policy issues might have on mobilization in 2020.
Although I have made the case that the differences reported here between 2018 and 2016 are the consequence of voters gaining greater knowledge about the positions of the two political parties on immigration policy, these differences could be traceable simply to the important differences between House candidates and the President on this and related policies. In that case, less cross-over support in 2018 than in 2016 might be the result of voters who do not see House candidates campaigning on an issue at all, not because they have obtained a more partisan understanding of it. If these were two independent cross-sectional samples of voters, another interpretation would be to attribute increased partisanship from 2016 to 2018 to the voters who have dropped out of the mid-term electorate -less interested and less partisan voters, consistent with the surge-and-decline pattern so commonly observed (Campbell 1960) . But given that this is a panel design observing the very same voters from 2016 to 2018 then that usual pattern of midterm drop-off is not present in these data. Even so, other plausible interpretations of these data are possible, and of course other surveys should be evaluated.
The two major parties are always searching for advantages on issues that will give them a reliable electoral advantage in general elections. Sometimes these advantages emerge in one or two elections, but they rarely endure for long as opposing parties react, candidates adapt, voters learn and their viewpoints adjust. Restriction-leaning immigration policies may command the same sizable share of voters in 2020 that gave President Trump the electoral advantage in 2016, but careful study of the changes in opinion since then suggest that his campaign should not take that for granted. 
